Poland's economic and political transition, one of the most successful transitions, has depended very heavily on the job creation in new firms to replace the jobs lost in the formerly state-owned enterprises.
Introduction
Accomplishing economic reform and democratization simultaneously is a daunting task, as many writers have observed. (See Hellman, 1998 .) Yet, with varying degrees of success a number of countries are accomplishing this feat, while some that seem unable to make the transition. A central factor contributing to economic success is the country's ability to encourage and support the de novo firm creation and growth, what Schumpeter called creative destruction.
(See Caballero and Hammour, 2000; Kornai, 2000 .) The Polish transition, often cited as one of the successful transitions, has depended very heavily on the job creation in new firms to replace the jobs lost in the formerly state-owned enterprises. (See Jackson, Klich and Poznańska, 2000a, Winiecki, 2000 .) This paper presents evidence from the Polish elections during the transition that these de novo firms, the individuals they employ, and the residents in the local areas where they exist become an important constituency supporting pro-reform political parties and constraining the actions of parties less sympathetic to the reforms. The creation of this political constituency helps explain how countries can successfully pursue both economic and political reforms.
A previous paper (Jackson, Klich and Poznańska, 2000b) used evidence from the 1993 Polish elections to argue that these creative economic activities have important political implications in that they nurture a small but potentially growing constituency that supports pro-reform parties and candidates. The votes for pro-reform parties can directly help the pro-reform party gain seats in the legislature, depending upon the particular election rules in place. Indirectly, the existence of this constituency, combined with the imperative to continue to win elections, constrains the actions of non-reform parties that otherwise might pursue policies that restrict or reverse the reforms. The ability of this emerging constituency to articulate its interests, to advocate for proreform policies, and to constrain the actions of incumbent parties depends upon a number of factors, such as the political rules governing elections and representation and the actions of party leaders in choosing different coalition strategies. We use the Polish elections in the period 1991 to 1997 to demonstrate four related points: the emergence of a pro-reform constituency based on the growth of new enterprises; the support this constituency gives to pro-reform parties; the consequences of different electoral rules and party strategies for how well this support is translated into parliamentary seats; and that the growth of this new economy constituency effects the policies of all parties, not just the pro-reform parties.
The paper begins with a brief summary of findings on the role of de novo firm creation in the development of market economies. The emphasis in this discussion is on the implications of this process for the development of a pro-reform political constituency. This is followed by an analysis of survey and election return data to show the development of such a constituency and their support for parties committed to further reform. The third section shows how the rules governing the allocation of parliamentary seats affects the political influence accorded the proreform parties. In the Polish case, the pro-reform party pushed for the adoption of rules that effectively weakened their influence relative to that of parties opposing reforms. We also show that the actions of party leaders in making, or not forming, political coalitions in response to these rules have a substantial bearing on the fortunes of reform parties. We end with a brief discussion of the current party maneuverings and actions being taken in preparation for the elections to be held in September, 2001 . These actions demonstrate the importance of this new constituency and how a variety of parties are trying to capture its support. Caballero and Hammour (2000, p. 11) contend that, "The evidence of extensive, ongoing job flows that are pervasive throughout the economy and constitute a major mechanism of productivity growth points to the centrality of creative destruction in the growth process." Poland is certainly no exception. We report in other work (Jackson, Klich and Poznańska, 2000b ) that based on data from the Polish Central Statistical Office (GUS) the birth and growth of new and small enterprises employing over five workers in 1997 added about 2.4 million jobs to the Polish economy between 1990 and 1997. Further, the Foundation for the Promotion of Small and Medium Sized Enterprises estimates that in 1997 there were nearly 1.5 million firms with zero to five employees and these enterprises employed 2.3 million workers (Dzierżowski, 1999) .
Creative Destruction and Pro-Reform Interests
Combining the estimates from the two data sources suggests that 4.6 million jobs were created in firms started after the transition began or in private firms with less than one hundred employees in 1990. The creative process contrasts sharply with the destruction that took place among the enterprises that were state and collectively owned and the large private firms (those employing more than 100 workers) existing in 1990. This set of enterprises showed a net loss of close to four million jobs, and gross job creation of only about seventy-five thousand jobs. 1 Statistical analyses of birth, survival and growth rates revealed a number of interesting relationships between regional characteristics and variations in these rates. One result was particularly relevant to the development and articulation of interest supporting the continuation of economic reforms. There were sizeable agglomeration effects, particularly for births of 1 The gross job creation and destruction estimates suggest a net job creation in the Polish economy, which is inconsistent with the persistently high unemployment rate. This obvious discrepancy can arise from a number of sources. One is overly optimistic job creation figures in one or the other data set. It is also likely that individual Poles are now holding more than one job, so that the number of individuals employed is not expanding as fast as the number of jobs. domestically owned manufacturing firms. Controlling for the total private sector employment, birth rates were positively related to the number of existing firms. (This finding is consistent with other results from a disparate set of sources, see Arthur, et. al, 1987 , Arthur, 1990 , Jackson and Thomas, 1995 , and Krugman, 1991 . Nowak, Urbaniak and Zienkowski, 1994 , present a similar finding specifically for Poland.) The implication of this result is that the creation of new economic activity, and the jobs and earnings it represents, will be regionally concentrated in areas where private firms already exist. In the Polish case, this primarily means in the larger, urban areas, such as Warszawa, Kraków, Gdańsk, Poznań, etc.
The proposition in our earlier paper is that the creation of these new firms and the successful transition to the transformed economy they represent will be accompanied by the development of voters with an interest in continuing or even accelerating the economic reforms. Data from the Polish General Social Survey (Cichomski and Morawski, 1998) Table 1 shows the proportions of the respondents in the lower and upper parts of the distributions and the gap between the two. The lower tail consists of respondents who expressed hardly any confidence in private firms and some or a great deal of confidence in state firms.
People in the upper tail say they have some or a great deal of confidence in private firms and hardly any confidence in state firms. Confidence in private firms eroded substantially following 2 The specific advantage of the PGSS study is that the questions and survey methodology are fairly consistent over the time so that any observed changes are more likely to be reflecting changes in the electorate than in survey methodology. The exception is that researchers experimented with question structure in half the 1997 survey. We have adjusted the variable definitions to account for these differences. In the experiment half the respondents received the previous question and half were asked the new format. This split sample allows us to compare response patterns and to then adjust the responses to the new formats accordingly. spouses' employment.) The biggest employment change was in the proportion in joint stock companies, which are enterprises in the process of privatization. There was a large decline in the proportions working in state enterprises, and a modest increase in employment in private firms, which includes self-employment. We argue that it is the relative size of these three groups that contributes to the support or opposition to reforms. Part C in the table shows the proportion of the workforce employed in firms begun since 1990 or that existed in 1990 but employed fewer than one hundred workers. Both parts B and C are included to illustrate the growth in the size of the de novo sector, and its potential for developing a pro-reform constituency.
Not surprisingly, respondents in families with employees in the private sector express far more confidence in the private sector than do workers in other ownership sectors. Appendix A shows the relationships between the confidence variable and a number of explanatory variables.
On the zero to one confidence scale, respondents where both members worked for a private employer had an expected confidence that was 0.12 higher than respondents with both members in the state sector. 
Polish Elections: 1991-1997
Poland conducted three parliamentary elections, 1991, 1993 and 1997 and one presidential election, 1995, between 1991 to 1997. 6 There is a considerable degree of continuity to the major issues during this period. In 1991, the major issues were the role of the Catholic church in Polish civil and political life and the role for former Communist leaders. Some parties, most notably the post-Communist SLD, were also campaigning against the effects of the stringent macro-economic policies adopted by the incumbent reform coalition led by the UD. By 1993 the liberal reform economic policies and their consequences had become a major issue. These three issues -the role for the church and church teachings, the political access for former Communists, and the pace and direction of economic reforms -would be the major political fault lines though with different degrees of emphasis through all four elections. (For extended discussions of the 1993 election, see Chan, 1995 and Powers and Cox, 1997 . Slay, 1994 , and Tworzecki, 1996 , have good discussions of the 1991 , 1993 5 Poland has 49 voivodships.Two were split into subdistricts for electoral purposes. Because data are not available for areas smaller than a voivodship the statistical analyses combine the districts in Katowice and in Warszawa into single districts that matches the voivodship. 6 The 1990 presidential election is excluded from our analysis.
The configuration of contending parties and candidates was much less stable through these elections. The SLD and the PSL are two so-called post-Communist parties because their leaders had been party officials in the Communist party before 1989. They formed the governing coalition from 1993 to 1997. The SLD is a broad coalition, including the former Communist trade union, the OPZZ. In 1991 the SLD campaigned strongly against the economic reforms and in favor of state intervention to protect Poland's heavy industry (See Tworzecki, 1996, p. 59) . Their economic platform became less opposed to the economic reforms with each election, though they were continually seen as opposing the reforms and even now their economic leaders disparage the UD policies promoted by Balcerowicz (see Kołodko, 2000) . The UP is included as a separate party even though it remained a small party, eventually losing it base after 1997, and never joined either of the governing coalitions after 1993. It is an interesting party, taking positions opposing economic reform and the role of the church that easily matched those of the SLD yet was strongly anti-Communist, reflecting the roots of some of its leaders in the Solidarność movement. The UP hoped to build its base on voters who opposed the reform, but who would not vote for the SLD because of its Communist background. As evidenced in Table 2 , this strategy did not prove to be very viable.
Lastly, there have been a series of small but strongly nationalistic parties that manage to win a small portion of the vote and a few seats in parliament. In addition to their nationalism, these parties advocated a very populist economic program in opposition to the liberal reforms, were strongly anti-Communist and generally were sympathetic to the church leaders. The KPN most vocally pushed this platform in 1991 and 1993, after which it lost its influence. Even though the KPN continued to exist as a party, its influence was taken over by the ROP, led by Jan Olszewski.
Olszewski ran for the presidency in 1995 and then led the ROP in the 1997 elections. There were attempts to get the ROP to join the AWS coalition, where there would have been agreement on many policies, but Olszewski chose to run separately.
This abbreviated description of the major issues and various parties and candidates contesting each election should help predict the likely vote choices of individuals supporting the economic reforms and with strong confidence in private firms. These people are most likely to support the UD/UW party and Kuroń's presidential candidacy. We can expect them to be unlikely to support the SLD, the PSL and the UP among the left parties and the Solidarity Trade Union on the right.
In the choice between Wałęsa and Kwaśniewski in the presidential election, they are most likely to support Wałęsa rather than the SLD leader. The pro-reformers may be somewhat ambivalent about the Catholic parties, who did not support the liberal reforms but who did not take highly visible positions on the economy.
Individual Vote Choices
We first analyze individual vote choices for the various elections using data collected as part of the Polish General Social Survey (Cichomski and Morawski, 1998) . The individual data allow us to relate vote choices to specific attitudes that cannot be observed at the aggregate level. With the survey data, the dependent variable is the log-odds the person said they voted for one of the competing parties relative to the UD or the UW in the 1991, 1993 and 1997 parliamentary elections and for one of the presidential candidates relative to Jacek Kuroń in the 1995 election.
The shortcoming of the survey data is that these assessments of how people voted are based on their recall, in two instances with a definite time lag between the election and the survey. There are a number of important comparisons in this table. Economic considerations played only a small role in the 1991 election, which was held after the start of the stringent reforms but before the full scope of the social costs became apparent. Subsequent to that election, the differences in likely vote choices associated with these different confidence levels are fairly substantial and consistent. Respondents with more confidence in private firms were more likely to vote for the UD+KLD/UW and less likely to vote for the SLD and to a lesser extent the UP. 
Election Returns
The second part of our analysis examines the actual voting returns by district in the 1993, 1995 and 1997 elections. There are two relevant questions. The first is the role played by new economic activity in building support for pro-reform parties, which will offset some of the opposition to the reforms generated by the economic hardships. This proposition is measured by the ratio of jobs created in de novo firms to the total workforce in each voivodship. The second question is again the stability of the relationships between vote shares for each party and the variables representing the variations in preferences on the basic issues -economic reform, antipathy towards former Communist officials, and the role of the Catholic church. The full estimated models are presented in Appendix C. The key results are that the coefficients relating vote shares to education levels, church attendance, and new job creation are relatively stable over these three elections, despite the maneuverings of the different parties and coalitions. These results are consistent with the analysis of individual vote decisions and indicate that across the three elections, the electorate is using the same issues to evaluate these parties and candidates and to make their vote choices.
Our key findings are shown in Table 4 , which is the expected change in national vote This is a substantial number of new jobs, but is useful for illustrative purposes. Relatively modest increases in the rates of birth, survival, and growth of new firms could yield such an increase in the number of new jobs over four to eight years. See Jackson, et. al. 1997. 11 Table 4 and Appendix C refer to the first round of the election, but analysis of the second round produced a coefficient that predicted an even larger vote shift. Given that Kwaśniewski's margin second round margin was 3.4%, a small shift in votes would have altered the outcome. 12 Confidence in the private sector declined during the period of highest unemployment and then began to recover in 1997 as more jobs were created in de novo private firms and as the economy recovered. This analysis suggests that this economic success did not particularly benefit the incumbent parties, but as people gained confidence in the private sector and as more new jobs were created they were more likely to support the pro-reform party, which was part of the opposition between 1993 and 1997.
Pro-Reform Interests and Representation
The creation of a pro-reform constituency is a necessary but not a sufficient part of choosing a pro-reform government. The method for allocating seats in parliament once votes have been cast is a critical concern. In any system, but particularly in a parliamentary system such as Poland's, the electoral rules creating voting and parliamentary districts and determining how votes are converted to seats for these districts has a critical bearing on what influence pro-reform 12 Statistical analyses of the three attitude questions used in the individual voting models indicated that other than year to year changes represented by dummy variables for each survey, there was no statistical difference in the relationships between individual characteristics and attitudes across the surveys.
interests can exert on national policy. It is at this point that the findings about the clustering of new enterprises and the agglomeration effects become important. The locational effects lead to the new business creation being concentrated in certain areas. A consequence of this clustering is that the pro-reform voters will also be concentrated rather than being widely distributed across the country. How districts are drawn and how seats are apportioned will affect the representation of pro-reform interests. This section examines the implications of different districting and seat allocation formulas by studying the different boundaries and rules Poland has used or might use in the next election.
A critical set of rules was adopted prior to the 1993 election at the urging of the coalition led by the UD. There were three critical rules designed to reduce the representation of smaller parties and to push consolidation of the parties --parties had to attain 5% and coalitions 8% of the election, so our analysis is also a preview of what these changes may mean for that election. In 1999 the forty-nine voivodships that formed the basis for allocating seats in 1993 and 1997 were consolidated into seventeen larger voivodships. For the sake of our analysis, we will assume that these new, larger voivodships formed the districts for the 1993 and 1997 elections and that the number of seats in these districts equaled the sum of the seats in the old districts being combined. 13 With this scenario we want to see how reducing the disparity in the number of seats 13 Though the voivodships are not perfectly matched to respresentational districts, see fn. 5, we treat them as such for analytical purposes in 1997. In 1993 we use the actual districts as we have per district might alter the distribution of seats. Our expectation is that this reduction in the number of small districts will make the seat allocation more proportional to vote shares. The second change is the replacement of the d'Hondt rule with the Sainte-Laguë method for allocating seats. Benoit (2000) concludes that the Sainte-Laguë is both the most proportional and the least favorable to large parties among all proportional representation formulas. The use of this seat allocation formula rather than the d'Hondt method should also make the seat allocations more closely match the vote shares. Both these rule changes should favor the smaller parties relative to the larger parties and bring the distribution of seats much closer to the distribution of votes. In 1997, the AWS would have lost twenty-eight seats and the SLD fifteen with the PSL being the biggest gainer, with eighteen new seats. Adopting both changes provided further movement towards equal proportions. The remaining difference between the vote and seat proportions is attributable to the presence of the national list of seats, which only went to parties receiving more than seven percent of the vote, reducing the seats for the minor parties in each election.
Eliminating the national list, as will also be done in 2001, would have favored the smaller parties with less than seven percent of the vote even more. It is easy to conclude that had the rule and districting changes been in effect in 1993 and/or 1997 they would have led to a different relationship between votes and seats and different seat allocations in the two parliaments.
The Decline of the Pro-Reform Party
One might well ask why the UD/UW's electoral fortunes declined so consistently since their large majority in 1991 to the point they may well not be able to seriously contend in the 2001 elections, given the amount of de novo firm and job creation in the Polish economy and our evidence about the contribution of this activity to building a pro-reform constituency and voting group. Part of the answer offers some insight into the dynamics of politics following economic and democratic reforms. Other parts are rooted in the idiosyncracies of Polish politics and closely match the boundaries of the older ones, meaning that our assumption is an excellent approximation, certainly for the expositional purposes of this paper. 14 We are assuming that individuals would have voted for the same parties under these "new" rules as they did under the actual system. This is very likely an appropriate assumption with respect to changing the number and size of the voivodships. With respect adopting the SainteLaguë formula we have to assume either that there was no strategic voting, which is a difficult assumption given the 5% and 8% thresholds, or that there would have been the same amount of political leadership in the aftermath of the Solidarność success. This is not the place to try to untangle the second part, but we can offer some observations on the first part. We point to two factors --an inability of the pro-reform parties to adapt to the rules they put in place and not enough de novo job creation, particularly in the early 1990's.
Electoral Rules and Party Coalitions
The electoral rules promoted by the UD and their coalition partners before the 1993 election were explicitly designed to reduce the number of competing parties by providing very strong incentives for the consolidation of the large number of parties holding seats after the 1991 election. The feeling was that this plethora of parties had contributed directly to the inability to establish a stable coalition government. As it turned out it was the governing coalition that was unable to consolidate. The main elements in the coalition government that fell in May, 1993 were the UD, KLD, and ZChN (Christian National Union). The latter was a church oriented nationalistic party that had campaigned in 1991 as part of a Catholic coalition party. The UD and KLD were virtually identical on all policy questions, particularly regarding the direction of reforms. The ZChN was more critical of the Balcerowicz policies, though they remained part of the UD led coalition. One might think that given the incentives in the electoral rules that at least the UD and the KLD would coalesce. It is more understandable why the ZChN might not join, as they disagreed with the economic policies and demanded a larger role for church teachings backed by legal force. The UD and KLD, by contrast, included members with a range of views regarding the role of the church and tried to avoid the issue. 15 All three parties ran separate campaigns in 1993, even knowing that the rules for allocating seats made these decisions risky.
In the end, the KLD received only four percent of the vote, less than the necessary five percent threshold. The ZChN joined a Catholic coalition, Catholic Electoral Committee "Fatherland", which received 6.4% of the vote, but since this was a coalition its threshold for being seated was eight percent so it also did not get any seats.
There are reasons to assume that if the UD and the KLD united prior to the 1993 election, as they did in May, 1994, shortly after the election, that the coalition would have received the sum of the votes each party won individually. This would have been 14.6% of the vote, making the strategic voting. The latter assumption is more plausible, as we have maintained the same thresholds. 15 To illustrate the divisions over the role of the church among UD members, its delegates split on the legislation to prohibit abortions, a major church supported issue. The SLD was quite and explicit and unified in opposing church influence and strongly opposed the limitations on abortions.
coalition a strong third place finisher .8% behind the PSL. Following the d'Hondt formula for allocating seats, the UD/KLD coalition would have received 97 seats, an increase of 23 over what the UD won by itself. The SLD would have lost ten seats and the other parties either three or four seats each. It is harder to argue that the ZChN might have remained in the "governing" coalition rather than join the Fatherland coalition, given the policy disagreements between its leaders and those in the UD. If they had, however, it would have created a bloc that would have rivaled the SLD for a plurality of the votes and of the seats, which might have been better than no seats at all.
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Job Creation
A second factor contributing to the electoral difficulties of the UD/UW was that the de novo job creation was too slow and too small. A counterfactual exercise is to ask what would the distribution of seats have been if there had been more jobs created in new enterprises? Table 4 shows how the national distribution of votes would have differed if job creation had been fifty percent higher. The biggest change is the increased vote share of the UD or UW, largely at the expense of the SLD, with smaller shares coming from the two right wing parties, the Solidarity
Trade Union and the KPN in 1993 and the AWS and the ROP in 1997. The leaders of all of these parties had been very critical of market oriented reforms and claimed to want a policy that would maintain the older state enterprises, though with a strong privatization program. 17 Such policies, though supportive of a private market, do not promote development through de novo firm creation and would mandate a strong role for the government in economic development. The question now is, how would these changes in vote proportions affect the allocation of seats. Table 6 shows the number of seats expected to go to each party under the more jobs scenarios for both the d'Hondt and Sainte-Laguë seat allocation rules. For 1993 we also show the allocations with the UD separate from the KLD and with their votes combined into a pseudocoalition party. The important observation is that our prediction of the number of additional 16 A more likely scenario is a merger of the Fatherland with the Solidarity Trade Union and the BBWR, the latter being an independent organization initiated by Wałęsa. The AWS coalition that won a plurality in 1997 is basically this combination of organizations. If this and the UD+KLD coalitions had emerged prior to the 1993 election rather than after, it would have dramatically restructured the composition of the new parliament, assuming the vote shares had stayed the same. The two differences between this outcome and what transpired in 1997 was that the PSL and UP lost most or all of their seats, with the AWS and SLD being the beneficiaries. 17 The appeals of these parties is evidenced by the strong association between the proportion of non-farm workers in state-owned enterprisers (included those being restructured but not fully privatized) and the votes for the Solidarity Trade Union in 1993 and the AWS and the ROP in 1997. We conclude from this analysis that additional job creation could have made a significant difference in the balance of power in the parliament, with the pro-reform party gaining a much larger share of the seats. As importantly from the standpoint of combining economic and political reform, the results indicate there is an important interaction between the success of the economic transformation and the political rules and strategies in affecting how well the pro-reform constituencies that will accompany successful transitions will be represented. Job creation will be geographically concentrated, so that electoral and representation rules that disadvantage these regions will reduce the influence of the pro-reform constituencies. The pro-reform parties must also realize they are politically vulnerable, particularly at the early stages when the de novo firm creation process is just beginning, and not adopt strategies that dilute their ability to attract voters.
The important lessons from this comparison are, one, that the advantages conveyed by shifts in electoral rules depend upon how those rules change the implicit thresholds for getting seats relative to the parties' vote distributions in the different districts. A second is that because the location of de novo firm and job creation is both geographically concentrated and greater in larger urban areas, rules that advantage urban areas and majority parties in those districts will increase the representation of pro-reform parties. This, of course, is the opposite of the rules adopted in 1993 and 1997, which advantaged larger parties, but those in more rural areas where there is less job creation in de novo firms.
Pro-Reform Parties and the 2001 Election
The electoral landscape has changed dramatically since the 1997 election victory by the AWS. The UW left the government in August, 2000 after a period of bickering over policy.
Given the substantial differences over economic policy between the leaders of the two parties, this might not be a surprise. Then, Aleksander Kwaśniewski, the former leader of the SLD was Our earlier proposition (Jackson, Klich and Poznańska, 2000b) where they hoped to attract entrepreneurs and business leaders by promising to reduce red tape, taxes, and follow other policies to promote the private sector. These are only promises, but they are promises from the party that only a decade earlier was advocating government support for heavy industry and that when they controlled the government was slow to promote privatization and supported wage increases for workers in state managed firms that went way beyond productivity increases and that exceeded wage increases in the private sector (Jackson, Klich and Poznańska, 2000a) .
These attempts by the PO and the SLD to appeal to the entrepreneurial class are particularly remarkable when set against the background of the current unemployment rate. After dropping below ten percent in late 1998, the unemployment rate is now close to sixteen percent, which was the peak during the transition in 1992-3. But, instead of calling for more government subsidy and intervention to protect employment in older firms, both parties are claiming they offer the best chance for stimulating job creation among new private enterprises. What each party will do if, or when, it is part of the government is another question, but the relative convergence of the two says a lot about the development of our proposed constituency and its political implications.
What the SLD will do and whether the Platform can succeed will be matter of considerable These projections ignore the possibility of strategic voting induced by the five percent threshold. It is certainly conceivable that people who express support for the UW or the ROP in a poll may vote differently if their first choice stands a chance of getting less than five percent of the vote. This could lead to defections to the larger parties, but given the differences over economic, social and religious policies it is hard to forecast which parties might benefit. Of course the ultimate irony is that it was a coalition led by the UD leaders, the UW's predecessor, in 1993 that passed the rules designed to increase the advantages for the largest parties, to limit the number of parties in the Parliament, and to force the smaller parties to merge. They are now the ones most likely to benefit by the rules change if they get more than five percent of the vote, or to suffer the most if they fall below this mark. But, with both the SLD and the PO advocating policies to stimulate new enterprises, the seats held by the UW and the right wing parties may be less relevant for economic policy than it would have been eight or even four years ago. The model is log(P ij /P i1 ) = X i B j + U ij , where P ij is the probability individual i voted for party j and P i1 is the probability she or he says they voted for the UD. The goodness of fit measures are tests of the model against increasingly richer models.
Model A has just a constant term and separate intercepts for 1997 and 1993 with the UD and KLD combined. This is compared to a model with just a constant term, which is predicting the same seat gain in all districts in all three elections. Adding the two dummy variables allows this These additional variables did not add significantly to the model and are omitted.
